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Abstract
A simple extension of the propositional temporal logic of linear
time is proposed. The extension consists of strengthening the until
operator by indexing it with the regular programs of propositional
dynamic logic (PDL). It is shown that DLTL, the resulting logic, is
expressively equivalent to S1S, the monadic second-order theory
of !-sequences. In fact a sublogic of DLTL which corresponds
to propositional dynamic logic with a linear time semantics is
already as expressive as S1S. We pin down in an obvious manner
the sublogic of DLTL which correponds to the rst order fragment
of S1S. We show that DLTL has an exponential time decision
procedure. We also obtain an axiomatization of DLTL. Finally,
we point to some natural extensions of the approach presented
here for bringing together propositional dynamic and temporal
logics in a linear time setting.
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1 Introduction
We present here a simple extension of the propositional temporal logic
of linear time (LTL). The basic idea is to strengthen the until modality
by indexing it with the regular programs of propositional dynamic logic
(PDL). The resulting logic, called dynamic linear time temporal logic
(DLTL), is easy to handle. It has the full expressive power of the monadic
second order theory of !-sequences (S1S). Indeed a sublogic of DLTL
is already equal in expressive power to S1S. A pleasant feature of this
sublogic is that it is just PDL operating in a linear time framework.
In addition to our expressiveness results we show that DLTL has an
exponential time decision procedure. We also extend the well known
axiomatization of PDL [9] to obtain an axiomatization of DLTL.
Our work may be viewed from two dierent perspectives. The rst
one is from the standpoint of process logics [6, 14, 16] which attempt a
rapprochement between dynamic and temporal logics. However the study
of process logics is committed to viewing dynamic logic as a restricted
kind of a branching time temporal logic. One then attempts to bring in
some additional mechanisms for talking about the computational paths
of a Kripke frame in a more sophisticated fashion. Our point of departure
from this line of work consists of merging, in a very simple way, dynamic
logic and temporal logic in a linear time setting.
The second perspective from which our work may be viewed has to
do with attempts to augment the limited expressive power of LTL. One
route consists of permitting quantication over atomic propositions. The
resulting logic called QPTL [18] has the expressive power of S1S and has
a decision procedure of non-elementary complexity. The second route
consists of augmenting LTL with the so called automaton connectives.
Indeed this additional feature is so powerful that the next and until
modalities become derived ones. The resulting logic called ETL [23] is
equal in expressive power to S1S while admitting an exponential time
decision procedure. To be precise, the version of ETL we have in mind
is the one referred to as ETLf in [21] but for convenience we will call it
just ETL here.
Our logic is, in spirit, inspired by ETL and in fact it may appear to
be at rst sight just a reformulation of ETL with some cosmetic changes.
This however has to do with the instinctive identication one makes be-
tween nite state automata and regular expressions. In fact DLTL is
quite dierent in terms of the mechanisms it oers for structuring formu-
las and we feel that it is more transparent and easier to work with. The
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results and the proofs we present here are designed to support this claim.
Our approach also leads to smooth generalizations in non-sequential set-
tings where similar extensions in terms of ETL will be hard to cope with
at least in terms of transparency.
In the next section we start with an action-based version of LTL in
order to x terminology and to introduce a key feature of DLTL. In
Section 3 we present DLTL and its semantics. This is then followed by a
more detailed assessment of the similarities and the dierences between
ETL and DLTL.
In Section 4 we prove the decidability of DLTL by reducing it to
the emptiness problem for Bu¨chi automata. In Section 5 we show that
DLTL−, a sublogic of DLTL, has the same expressive power as S1S. This
then easily leads to the conclusion that DLTL, DLTL− and S1S are all
equal in expressive power. We then establish similar results for the rst-
order fragment of S1S with the help of the \star-free" fragments of DLTL
and DLTL−.
In Section 6, we extend the axiomatization of PDL and the complete-
ness proof in [9] to obtain nitary axiomatizations of DLTL and DLTL−.
In the nal section we point to two natural generalizations in the setting
of distributed systems. These generalizations appear to be eminently ac-
cessible and oer additional support to our belief that the synthesis of
dynamic and temporal logics in a linear time framework as pursued here
is a fruitful one.
2 Linear Time Temporal Logic
One key feature of the syntax and semantics of our temporal logic is the
treatment of actions as rst class objects.
The usual treatment of LTL [10, 15] is based on states viewed as
subsets of a nite set of atomic propositions. We wish to bring in actions
explicitly for a number of reasons. Firstly, in a state-based approach there
is a mismatch between the models of a formula and the language accepted
by the associated !-automaton. A model will consist of a sequence of
states whereas the automaton will accept or reject a sequence of actions.
Thus the alphabet of the automaton will correspond to the possible states
of the model. However this is not a major hurdle and it leads, at worst, to
minor technical overheads. The more important point is that it is dicult
to dene synchronized products of sequential components in a purely
state-based setting. Since this is a very common and useful method of
3
specifying distributed behaviours, we feel that it is handy to work with
logics in which both states and actions can be treated on an equal footing.
As a vehicle for introducing some terminology and for later compar-
isons we shall rst introduce an action-based version of LTL denoted
LTL(). We begin with some notations.
Through the rest of the paper we x a nite non-empty alphabet .
We let a; b range over  and refer to members of  as actions.  is the
set of nite words and ! is the set of innite words generated by  with
! = f0; 1; : : :g. We set 1 = [! and denote the null word by ". We
let ; 0 range over ! and ;  0;  00 range over . Finally  is the usual
prex ordering dened over  and for u 2 1, we let prf(u) be the set
of nite prexes of u.
Next we x a countable set of atomic propositions P = fp1; p2; : : :g
and let p; q range over P . The set of formulas of LTL() is then given
by the syntax:
LTL() ::= p j  j  _  j hai j  U :
Through the rest of this section ;  will range over LTL(). The
modality hai is an action-indexed version of the next state modality of
LTL as we shall soon see.
A model of LTL() is a pair M = (; V ) where  2 ! and V :
prf() −! 2P is a valuation function. Let M = (; V ) be a model,
 2 prf() and  be a formula. Then M;  j=  will stand for  being
satised at  in M . This notion is dened inductively in the expected
manner.
 M;  j= p i p 2 V ().
 M;  j=  i M;  6j= .
 M;  j=  _  i M;  j=  or M;  j= .
 M;  j= hai i a 2 prf() and M; a j= .
 M;  j=  U  i there exists  0 such that  0 2 prf() andM;  0 j=
. Moreover for every  00 such that "   00   0, it is the case that
M;  00 j= .
For further reference we note that the next-state modality of LTL is
denable via O
() Wa2hai: It is well known [4, 8] that LTL() is
expressively equivalent to the rst-order theory of sequences. Hence this
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temporal logic has denite limitations of expressive power. In particular,
as pointed out by Wolper in a state-based setting [22], the property \p
holds at every even position" is not denable in this logic. The dynamic
version of LTL() that we introduce in the next section is designed to
overcome this kind of expressive limitation.
3 Dynamic Linear Time Temporal Logic
Our extension of LTL() basically consists of indexing the until operator
with the programs of PDL (e.g. [3, 5]). We start by dening the set of
programs (regular expressions) generated by . This set is denoted by
Prg() and its syntax is given by:
Prg() ::= a j 0 + 1 j 0; 1 j :
Here and elsewhere, ; 0 with or without subscripts will range over
Prg(). With each program we associate a set of nite words via the
map jj  jj : Prg() −! 2. This map is dened in the standard fashion.
 jjajj = fag.
 jj0 + 1jj = jj0jj [ jj1jj.
 jj0; 1jj = f01 j 0 2 jj0jj and 1 2 jj1jjg.
 jjjj = Si2! jjijj, where
{ jj0jj = f"g and
{ jji+1jj = f01 j 0 2 jjjj and 1 2 jjijjg for every i 2 !.
Again we x a countable set of atomic propositions P = fp1; p2; : : :g
and let p; q range over P . Then the set of formulas of DLTL() is given
by the following syntax.
DLTL() ::= p j  j  _  j  U:
Here and throughout the rest of the paper we take ;  to range over
DLTL(). The notion of a model is as in the case of LTL(). So let
M = (; V ) be a model,  2 prf() and  2 DLTL(). Then M;  j= 
is dened inductively.
 M;  j= p i p 2 V ().
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 M;  j=  i M;  6j= .
 M;  j=  _  i M;  j=  or M;  j= .
 M;  j=  U i there exists  0 2 jjjj such that  0 2 prf() and
M;  0 j= . Moreover, for every  00 such that "   00   0, it is the
case that M;  00 j= .
Thus DLTL() is obtained form LTL() by strengthening the until
operator. To satisfy  U, one must satisfy U along some nite
stretch of behaviour which is in the (linear time) behaviour of the pro-
gram .
As usual,  2 DLTL() is satisable i there exist a model M =
(; V ) and  2 prf() such that M;  j= . The satisability problem is,
given , to decide whether  is satisable.
Apart from the conventional derived propositional connectives such
as ^; and  the derived modality hi and its dual [] will play an
important role in the sequel. They are dened as follows:
 > () p1_ p1. Recall that P = fp1; p2; : : :g.
 hi () > U.
 [] () hi.
Suppose M = (; V ) is a model and  2 prf(). It is easy to see
that ;  j= hi i there exists  0 2 jjjj such that  0 2 prf() and
;  0 j= . It is also easy to see that ;  j= [] i for every  0 2 jjjj,
if  0 2 prf() then ;  0 j= . In this sense, the program modalities of
PDL acquire a linear time semantics in the present setting.
Note that a 2  is a member of Prg() and hence hai is a derived
modality. It is also easy to see that the until operator of LTL() can
be obtained via: U ()  U. Thus LTL() is a fragment of
DLTL(). To see that DLTL() is strictly more expressive than LTL(),
let  = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang and ev = ((a1+a2+: : :+an); (a1+a2+: : :+an)).
It is now easy to see that ev = [ev]p is a specication of the property
"p holds at every even position".
We shall close out the section by briefly discussing the key dier-
ences between DLTL() and ETL, the extension of LTL proposed by
Wolper [22]. As mentioned earlier, the version of ETL we shall con-
sider here is the one called ETLf in [21]. We shall present a simplied
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form of ETL so as to stay close to DLTL. First we x an enumeration
of  = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang. The syntax of the logic that we shall name as
ETL() is then given by:
ETL() ::= p j  j  _ 0 j A(0; 1; : : : ; n):
Here ; 0; 0; 1; : : : ; n are assumed to be formulas of ETL(). Further,
A is a nite state automaton of the form A = (Q;−!; Qin; F ) with
−!  QQ as the transition relation, Qin  Q as the initial states
and F  Q as the accepting states. In what follows we let L(A) be
the language of nite words accepted by A. Moreover we shall assume
for the sake of convenience that " 62 L(A) for each formula of the form
A(0; 1; : : : ; n).
A model for ETL() is, as before, a pair M = (; V ) with V :
prf() −! 2P . Let  2 prf(). Then M;  j=  is dened via:
 M;  j= p i p 2 V ().
 M;  j=  i M;  6j= .
 M;  j=  _ 0 i M;  j=  or M;  j= 0.
 M;  j= A(0; 1; : : : ; n) i there exists ai1ai2 : : : aim 2 L(A) such
that the following conditions are satised:
| i1; i2; : : : ; im 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng. (recall that  = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang).
| ai1ai2   aim 2 prf().
| M;  j= 0 and M; ai1   aij j= ij for 1  j  m.
Though the technical details are somewhat dierent, ETL() cap-
tures the spirit of the logic presented in [21]. The key drawback of
ETL(), as we see it, lies in its lack of structuring principles for forming
compound formulas. Stated dierently, the only mechanism that ETL()
has | apart from the boolean connectives | to form compound formulas
is by nesting the automaton formulas. Thus a typical compound formula
would look like:
A1(10;A2(20; 21;A3(30; : : : ; 3n); 23; : : : ; 2n); 12; : : : ; 1n):
In contrast, DLTL() adds to the familiar mechanisms of LTL an orthog-
onal and well-understood component; namely, the language of regular ex-
pressions. Equally important, this orthogonal component is formulated
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purely in terms of  and not in terms of arbitrary formulas as is the case
of ETL. In fact, ETL, as formulated in [21] has an uncontrolled amount
of \external" elements in the sense that the states and the alphabets of
the automata which are used to write down the automaton formulas have
little to do with the logic under consideration.
4 A Decision Procedure for DLTL
The goal here is to show that the satisability problem for DLTL() can
be solved in deterministic exponential time. This will be achieved by
eectively constructing for each  2 DLTL(), a Bu¨chi automaton B
such that the language of !-words accepted by B is non-empty i  is
satisable.
We shall use the terminology adopted in [20] for dealing with Bu¨chi
automata. In particular, a Bu¨chi automaton over  is a tuple B =
(Q;−!; Qin; F ) where:
 Q is a nite non-empty set of states.
 −!  Q Q is a transition relation.
 Qin  Q is a set of initial states.
 F  Q is a set of accepting states.
Let  2 !. Then a run of B over  is a map  : prf() −! Q such that:
 (") 2 Qin.
 () a−! (a) for each a 2 prf().
The run  is accepting i inf() \ F 6= ; where inf()  Q is given by
q 2 inf() i () = q for innitely many  2 prf(). Finally L(B), the
language of !-words accepted by B, is:
L(B) = f j 9 an accepting run of B over g:
Through the rest of the section we x a formula 0. To construct B0
we rst dene the (Fischer-Ladner) closure of 0 as follows. cl(0) is the
least set of formulas that satises:
 0 2 cl(0).
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 If  2 cl(0) then  2 cl(0).
 If  _  2 cl(0) then ;  2 cl(0).
 If  U 2 cl(0) then ;  2 cl(0).
Now CL(0), the closure of 0, is dened to be:
CL(0) = cl(0) [ f j  2 cl(0)g:
In what follows  will be identied with . Moreover, until the end of
the section, all the formulas that we encounter | unless stated otherwise
| will be assumed to be members of CL(0). For convenience, we shall
often write CL instead of CL(0).
A  CL is called an atom i it is a subset of CL satisfying:
  2 A i  62 A.
  _  2 A i  2 A or  2 A.
 If  2 A and " 2 jjjj then  U 2 A.
AT (0) is the set of atoms and again we shall often write AT instead
of AT (0). Next we dene Req(0), the set of until requirements of 0,
to be the subset of CL given by:
Req(0) = f U j  U 2 CLg:
We shall write Req instead Req(0) and take ; 
0 to range over Req. For
each  =  U 2 Req we x a nite state automaton A such that
L(A) = jjjj where L(A) is the language of nite words accepted by
A. We shall assume each such A is of the form A = (Q;−!; I; F)
where Q is the set of states, −!  Q    Q is the transition
relation, I  Q is the set of initial states and F  Q is the set of
nal states. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that  6= 0
implies Q \ Q0 = ; for every ; 0 2 Req. We set Q =
S
2ReqQ andbQ = Q f0; 1g.
The Bu¨chi automaton B0 associated with 0 (from now on denoted
as B) can now be dened as
B = (S;=); Sin; F );
where the various components of B are specied as follows:
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(1) S  AT  2Q  2 bQ  f0; 1g  f#;Xg such that (A;X; bX; x; f) 2 S
i the following conditions are satised for each  =  U:
(i) If  2 A then F  X. (Recall that A = (Q;−!; I; F)).
(ii) If  2 A and q 2 X for some q 2 I then  U 2 A.
(iii) If  U 2 A then either  2 A and " 2 jjjj or (q; 1−x) 2 bX
for some q 2 I. (Note that we are considering the candidate
(A;X; bX; x; f) for membership in S).
(iv) If (q; z) 2 bX with q 62 F or  62 A then  2 A.
(2) The transition relation =)  S   S is dened as follows:
(A;X; bX; x; f) a=) (B; Y; bY ; y; g)
i the following conditions are satised for each  =  U:
(i) Suppose q0 2 Q \ Y and q a−! q0 and  2 A. Then q 2 X.
(ii) Suppose (q; z) 2 bX with q 2 Q. Suppose further that q 62 F
or  62 A. Then (q0; z) 2 bY for some q0 with q a−! q0.
(iii) If f = X then (y; g) = (1− x; #). If f = # then,
(y; g) =
8<: (x; #); if there exists (q; x) 2
bX such that
q 62 F or  62 A:
(x;X); otherwise:
(3) Sin = f(A;X; bX; x; f) j 0 2 A and (x; f) = (0;X)g.
(4) F = f(A;X; bX; x; f) j f = Xg
We wish to prove that 0 is satisable i L(B) 6= ;. Afterwards we
will argue that the size of B can be chosen to be at most exponential in
the size of 0.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose L(B) 6= ;. Then 0 is satisable.
Proof: Let  2 L(B) and  : prf() −! S be an accepting run. For each
 2 prf(), let () = (A ; X ; bX ; x ; f ). Dene the model M = (; V )
via:
V () = A \ P for all  2 prf():
We shall prove the following intermediate result.
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Claim: For all  2 prf() and  2 CL;
M;  j=  i  2 A :
First note that if the claim is true then Lemma 4.1 follows at once. This
is so because  is a run of B and hence (") 2 Sin. But from (3) (in
the denition of B), it follows that 0 2 A". Thus M; " j= 0 and 0 is
satisable.
In proving the claim we will repeatedly refer to various clauses in the
denition of the Bu¨chi automaton B.
We proceed by structural induction on . For the base case and the
boolean connectives the claim is obvious. Hence assume that  =  U.
Suppose that M;  j=  U. Since M;  j=  U there exists
 0 2 jjjj such that  0 2 prf() and M;  0 j= . Moreover, M;  00 j= 
for every  00 2  such that "   00   0.
Suppose  0 = ". Then " 2 jjjj and M;  j= . By the induc-
tion hypothesis  2 A . From the denition of an atom it follows that
 U 2 A .
So assume that  0 6= ". Let  =  U and R be an accepting run
of A over  0 = a1a2 : : : an with R(") = q0 2 I and R(a1a2 : : : ai) =
qi for 1  i  n and qn 2 F. Since M;  0 j=  we have from the
induction hypothesis that  2 A 0 . Hence by (1.i), F  X 0. Now
by the denition of R we are assured that qn−1
an−! qn. On the other
hand, the fact that M;  j=  U and the choice of  0 guarantee that
M; a1 : : : an−1 j=  (with the convention that " = a1 : : : an−1 in case
n = 1). By the induction hypothesis  2 Aa1:::an−1 , so by (2.i) and the
fact that qn 2 Xa1:::an , we have that qn−1 2 Xa1:::an−1 . In case n  2 we
repeat the above argument at qn−1 to conclude that qn−2 2 Xa1:::an−2 .
Continuing this way we can nally arrive at q0 2 X and  2 A . But
q0 2 I and hence by (1.ii) we are assured that  U 2 A .
For the converse direction assume that  U 2 A . The are four
cases to consider depending on the values of x and f . We will only
prove the rst case. The remaining cases can be resolved by very similar
arguments.
So assume that x = 0 and f = #. Suppose rst that  2 A and
" 2 jjjj. Then by the induction hypothesis M;  j=  and hence we at
once have M;  j=  U. So assume that  62 A or " 62 jjjj. Then by
(1.iii), (q0; 1) 2 bX for some q0 2 I. Suppose q0 2 F. Then " 2 jjjj and
thus  62 A . This implies, by (1.iv), that  2 A , and by the induction
hypothesis we have that M;  j= .
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Now with  being an accepting run of B over  there must exist 1
and 2 in 
 such that the following conditions are satised:
 1 6= " and 2 6= " and 12 2 prf().
 f1 = X and f12 = X. (Recall the notational convention that
(u) = (Au; Xu; bXu; xu; fu) for each u 2 prf()).
 For each  001 and  002 in , if "   001  1 then f( 001 ) 6= X and if
"   002  2 then f(1 002 ) 6= X.
Let 1 = a1a2 : : : an and 2 = b1b2 : : : bm. Now ()
a1=) (a1),
 U 2 A and (q0; 1) 2 bX . Moreover, we have that q0 62 F (if
" 62 jjjj) or  62 A . Thus by (2.ii), there exists q1 2 Q such that
q0
a1−! q1 and (q1; 1) 2 bXa1 .
Now suppose q1 2 F and  2 Aa1 . Then a1 2 jjjj and by the
induction hypothesis M; a1 j= . Since M;  j=  has already been
deduced we have M;  j=  U. So assume that q1 62 F or  62 Aa1 .
Then by repeating the arguments we had above for q0 at q1 we can ar-
rive at  2 Aa1 , and hence by the induction hypothesis M; a1 j= .
Moreover, we can conclude that there exists q2 2 Q such that q1 a2−! q2
and (q2; 1) 2 bXa1a2 . Marching down 1 using this sequence of arguments
we will either terminate with the conclusion M;  j=  U or we will
exhaust all of 1 while being able to conclude that there must exist states
q0; q1; : : : ; qn 2 Q such that q0 a1−! q1 a2−! q2 : : : qn−1 an−! qn. Further-
more, we will be able to conclude that M;  001 j=  for every  001 such that
"   001  1. Finally, we will also be assured that (qn; 1) 2 bX1 .
Now suppose qn 2 F and  2 A1 . Then 1 2 jjjj and M; 1 j= 
by the induction hypothesis. Consequently M;  j=  U. So assume
that qn 62 F or  62 A1 . Then  2 A1 (by (1.iv)) and hence M; 1 j=
 by the induction hypothesis. Now by the choice of 1, we know that
(x1 ; f1) = (0;X) and hence (x1b1 ; f1b1) = (1; #) by (2.iii). On the
other hand, (1)
b1=) (1b1) implies that there exists q01 2 Q such
that qn
b1−! q01 and (q01; 1) 2 bX1b1 . Again q01 2 F and  2 A1b1 will
lead to the desired conclusion M;  j=  U.
So suppose q01 62 F or  62 A1b1 . Then as before,  2 A1b1 and
hence M; 1b1 j=  by induction hypothesis. By the choice of 2 we
are assured that m  2 because f1b1 = #. So consider (1b1) b2=)
(1b1b2). Then again it follows easily that there must exist q
0
2 2 Q such
that q01
b2−! q02 and (q02; 1) 2 bX1b1b2 . If q02 2 F and  2 A1b1b2 then we
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will at once obtain M;  j=  U. If not, the facts that (q01; 1) 2 bX1b1
and that q01 62 F or  62 A1b1 holds, guarantee us that f1b1b2 = # by
(2.iii). Hence m  3. Carrying on this way we will eventually exhaust
all of 2 and while doing so, reach the desired conclusion M;  j=  U.
2
Lemma 4.2 Suppose 0 is satisable. Then L(B) 6= ;.
Proof: Since our logic has no past modalities it is easy to see that if 0
is satisable then there exists a model M = (; V ) such that M; " j= 0.
We shall show that  2 L(B) by constructing a map  : prf() −! S
so that  is an accepting run of B over . For each  2 prf() we set
() = (A ; X ; bX ; x ; f) and dene  in a componentwise manner.
For each  2 prf() dene A via:
A = f jM;  j= g:
For each  2 prf() dene X as follows. Suppose  =  U and
q 2 Q. Then q 2 X i there exists a pair ( 0; R0) such that:
  0 2 prf() and M;  0 j= .
 For every  00, if "   00   0 then M;  00 j= .
 R0 : prf( 0) −! Q such that R0(") = q and R0( 0) 2 F and
R0( 00) a−! R0( 00a) for every  00a 2 prf( 0).
To dene the remaining three components we will rst dene the
fourth and fth components by mutual induction. To this end we shall
make use of some terminology.
We shall call the pair (; ) an obligation in M if  2 prf() and
 =  U 2 Req such that M;  j=  U but M;  6j=  or " 62 jjjj.
Let (; ) be an obligation in M . We shall say that the pair ( 0; R0) is a
witness for (; ) i the following conditions are satised:
  0 2 prf() and M;  0 j=  and for every  00, "   00   0 implies
M;  00 j= .
  0 2 jjjj and R0 : prf( 0) −! Q such that R0(") 2 I, R0( 0) 2 F
and R0( 00) a−! R0( 00a) for every  00a 2 prf( 0).
Note that if ( 0; R0) is a witness for the obligation (; ) then  0 6= ".
We shall x a chronicle set CH for M . It is a set of quadruples which
satises the following conditions:
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 If (; ;  0; R0) 2 CH then (; ) is an obligation in M and ( 0; R0)
is witness for (; ).
 If (; ) is an obligation in M then (; ;  0; R0) 2 CH for some
witness ( 0; R0) for (; ).
 If (; ;  0; R0), (; ;  00; R00) 2 CH then ( 0; R0) = ( 00; R00).
It is easy to check that CH exists. (In fact it can be chosen in a canonical
manner by xing a lexicographic order on Q for each  2 Req).
With these denitions in place, we are now prepared to dene the
fourth and the fth components of  by induction on  . For the base case,
we set (x"; f") = (0;X). Now consider the induction step where  = 0a
and assume that (x 0 ; f 0) is dened for every 
0 2 prf(0). If f0 = X then
(x ; f ) = (1− x0 ; #). Suppose f0 = #. Then (x ; f ) = (x0 ; #) if there
exists (1; 1; 
0
1; R
0
1) 2 CH such that 1  0  1 01 and x1 = 1 − x0 .
Otherwise, f = X and x = x0 .
Finally, the third component of  can now be dened. For each  2
prf(), we dene bX as follows. Suppose  2 Req and q 2 Q and
z 2 f0; 1g. Then (q; z) 2 bX i there exists (1; ;  01; R01) 2 CH such
that for some  001 2 prf( 01), 1   = 1 001 . Moreover, R01( 001 ) = q and
x1 = 1− z.
We now wish to argue that  : prf() −! S is an accepting run of
B over . First we shall show that  is well dened. Let  2 prf() be
given. We must show that () 2 S. It is easy to see that A is an atom,
X  Q, bX  bQ, x 2 f0; 1g and f 2 f#;Xg. We will show that ()
satises all the clauses of the denition of B.
So x some  U = . Assume initially that  2 A and q 2 F.
Then M;  j=  by denition of A . Now consider the pair ( 0; R0) where
 0 = " and R0(") = q. From the denition of X it now follows that
q 2 X . Thus F  X as required by (1.i).
Next assume that  2 A and q 2 X for some q 2 I. From the
denition of X it follows that there exists a pair (
0; R0) such that  0 2
prf() and M;  0 j=  and M;  00 j=  for every  00 such that " 
 00   0. Furthermore, R0 : prf( 0) −! Q such that R0(") = q and
R0( 0) 2 F and R0( 00) a−! R0( 00a) for every  00a 2 prf( 0). But from
the assumption that q 2 I we have that  0 2 jjjj, because R0 is an
accepting run of A over  0. Consequently M;  j=  U and this leads
to the conclusion that  U 2 A as required by (1.ii).
Next assume that  U 2 A and  62 A or " 62 jjjj. Then
(; ) is an obligation in M since by the denition of A , M;  j=  U
14
but M;  6j=  or " 62 jjjj. Hence there exists (; ;  0; R0) 2 CH. Let
R0(") = q. From the fact that ( 0; R0) is a witness for (; ) we have that
q 2 I. Moreover, by the denition of bX and from    =  (i.e. 1 = 
and  001 = "), it follows that (q; 1− x ) 2 bX as required by (1.iii).
Finally suppose that (q; z) 2 bX with q 2 Q such that q 62 F or
 62 A. Now (q; z) 2 bX implies, by the denition of bX , that there
exists (1; ; 
0
1; R
0
1) 2 CH such that for some  001 2 prf( 01), 1   = 1 001
and R01(
00
1 ) = q and x1 = 1 − z. But ( 01; R01) is a witness for the
obligation (1; ) and hence R
0
1(
0
1) 2 F and M; 1 01 j= . Since  62 A
or q 62 F it must be the case that  001   01 and hence M; 1 001 j= . But
then  = 1
00
1 now leads to  2 A as required by (1.iv).
We have now shown that  is well dened. Next we wish to show that
 is a run of B over . Since M; " j= 0 we have 0 2 A". By denition,
(x"; f") = (0;X). Hence (") 2 Sin.
Now suppose a 2 prf(). We must show that () a=) (a). For
this purpose we x  U =  2 Req. Suppose q; q0 2 Q with q0 2 Xa
such that q
a−! q0. Further suppose  2 A . Now q0 2 Xa implies
that there exists a pair ( 0; R0) such that R0(") = q0 and R0( 0) 2 F and
R0( 00) b−! R0( 00b) for every  00b 2 prf( 0). Furthermore, M; a 0 j= 
and M; a 00 j=  for every  00 such that "   00   0. Now consider the
pair (a 0; R0a) where R
0
a : prf(a
0) −! Q is given as R0a(") = q and for
every  00 2 prf( 0), R0a(a 00) = R0( 00). From M;  j=  (as  2 A by
assumption) it now follows at once that q 2 X as required by (2.i).
Suppose now that q 2 Q and (q; z) 2 bX but q 62 F or  62 A .
Since (q; z) 2 bX there must exist (1; ;  01; R01) 2 CH and  001 2 prf( 01)
such that 1   = 1 001 and x1 = 1−z and R01( 001 ) = q. But ( 01; R01) is a
witness for (1; ) and hence R
0
1(
0
1) 2 F and M; 1 01 j= . Consequently
 001   01 and thus  001 a 2 prf( 01) for the unique a. This implies that
R01(
00
1 )
a−! R01( 001 a). Let R01( 001 a) = q0. Then q a−! q0. But then
it follows directly from the denition of Xa, that (q
0; 1 − z) 2 bXa as
required by (2.ii).
Next suppose that f = X. Then clearly (xa; fa) = (1−x ; #) by the
denition of . So assume that f = #. Supposing there exists  U = 
in Req and there exists q 2 Q such that (q; z) 2 bX where z = x .
Further suppose q 62 F or  62 A . Now (q; z) 2 bX implies that there
exists (1; ; 
0
1; R1
0) 2 CH such that 1   = 1 001 for some  001 2 prf( 01)
with the further property that x1 = 1 − z. From the denitions and
the fact that q 62 F or  62 A it follows that 1    1 01. Hence
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by the denition of  it follows that (xa; fa) = (x ; #) as required by
(2.iii). On the other hand, if such a (q; z) 2 bX does not exist, then it
follows directly from the denition that (xa; fa) = (x ;X) as required
by (2.iii).
We have now veried that  is a run of B over . To show that  is
accepting it suces to prove that for any  2 prf() there exists  0 such
that  0 2 prf() and f 0 = X.
Case 1: (x ; f ) = (0;X). By picking  0 = " the desired conclusion
follows trivially.
Case 2: (x ; f ) = (0; #). Dene the set Γ  CH as follows. Sup-
pose (; ;  0; R0) 2 CH. Then it must be the case that (1; 1;  01; R01) 2 Γ
i 1    1 01 and x1 = 1. If Γ = ; then it is easy to see that with
 0 = a where a 2 prf() we must have f 0 = X as required.
So suppose Γ 6= ;. Dene, for each ch = (1; 1;  01; R01) 2 Γ , kch =
j1 01j − j j and set k = max(fkchgch2Γ ). Let a 2 prf(). Then it is
easy to see that (xa; fa) = (0; #). But it is also easy to verify Γa = ; or
ka < k . Proceeding in this way the required conclusion can be drawn
eventually.
The two other cases can be resolved by similar arguments. 2
It is now straightforward to establish the main result of this section.
To start with we dene the size of a formula , denoted jj, via:
 jpj = 1, jj = 1 + jj and j _ j = 1 + jj+ jj.
 j Uj = 1 + jj+ jj+ jj,
where jj is given by jaj = 1, j + 0j = j; 0j = 1 + jj + j0j and
jj = 1 + jj.
Theorem 4.3 For each  2 DLTL() the question whether or not  is
satisable can be decided in time 2O(jj).
Proof: Let 0 2 DLTL(). Then 0 is satisable i L(B0) 6= ; where
0 is the Bu¨chi automaton constructed above. The emptiness problem
for B0 can be settled in O(jSj) where S is the set of states of B [20].
Clearly CL(0) is linear in the size of 0 and hence jAT j = 2O(j0j).
Let  U 2 Req. It is known that for  2 Prg(), we can construct
in polynomial time a non-deterministic nite state automaton A with
L(A) = jjjj such that jQj is linear in the size of  (see [7] for a recent
account on converting regular expression to small nite state automata).
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Let Req = f1 U11; : : : ; m Ummg. Then j1j+ j2j+ : : :+ jmj 
j0j. Consequently both Q and bQ are linear in the size of 0. It is now
easy to see that jSj = 2O(j0j). 2
As usual, the decision procedure can be applied to solve the associated
model checking problem but we will not enter into details here.
5 Some Expressiveness Results
Our main goal here is to show that DLTL() has the same expressive
power as the monadic second-order theory of innite sequences over .
Towards the end of the section we will also establish that a natural
sublogic of DLTL() captures the rst order theory of innite sequences
over .
In order to obtain clean formulations of the expressiveness results, we
shall banish atomic propositions through the rest of the paper. Instead,
we will just work with the constant > and its negation > () ?. To
be precise, the syntax of DLTL() will be from now on assumed to be:
DLTL() ::= > j  j  _  j  U;
where  2 Prg() with Prg() dened as before.
A model is now just a !-sequence  2 !. For  2 prf() we dene
;  j=  via:
 ;  j= >.
 All the other clauses are lled in exactly as in Section 3 while
replacing M by  in the appropriate places.
Each formula  now denes a !-language L  ! given by:
L = f j ; " j= g:
We say that L  ! is DLTL()-denable i there exists some  2
DLTL() such that L = L.
The monadic second-order theory of innite sequences over  is de-
noted S1S(). Its vocabulary consists of a family of unary predicates
fRaga2, one for each a 2 ; a binary predicate ; a binary predi-
cate "; a countable supply of individual variables Var = fx; y; z; : : :g;
a countable supply of set variables (i.e. monadic predicate variables)
SVar = fX; Y; Z; : : :g. The formulas of S1S() are then built up by:
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 Ra(x), x  y and x 2 X are atomic formulas.
 If  and 0 are formulas then so are , _ 0, (9x) and (9X).
A structure for S1S() is a !-sequence  2 !. Let I be an interpre-
tation of the variables with I : Var −! ! and I : SVar −! 2!. Then
the notion of  being a model of  under the interpretation I, denoted
 j=I , is dened in the expected manner. In particular,  j=I Ra(x)
i (I(x)) = a (note that  2 ! is here to be viewed as  : ! −! );
 j=I x  y i I(x)  I(y) (here  is the usual ordering over !);
 j=I x 2 X i I(x) 2 I(X).
As usual, a sentence is a formula with no free variables. Each sentence
 denes a !-language denoted L where:
L = f j  j= g:
We say that L  ! is S1S()-denable i there exists a sentence  2
S1S() such that L = L.
Lemma 5.1 Let L  !. If L is DLTL()-denable then L is S1S()-
denable.
Proof: Consider the construction from the previous section which asso-
ciates a Bu¨chi automaton B0 with each formula 0 2 DLTL(). Suppose
we apply this construction to formulas arising from the restricted syntax
assumed in the present section. Then it is easy to see that, in the ab-
sence of atomic propositions, L0 = L(B0). But then the classic result
of Bu¨chi [1] asserts that L  ! is S1S()-denable i there exists a
Bu¨chi automaton B operating over  such that L = L(B). 2
Next we wish to show that if L  ! is S1S()-denable then L is
DLTL()-denable. In fact, it turns out that it suces to consider a
natural fragment of DLTL() denoted DLTL−() whose syntax is given
by:
DLTL−() ::= > j  j  _  j hi;
where  2 Prg().
Here hi is interpreted as >U  with the resulting semantics. As
before L  ! is said to be DLTL−()-denable i there exists  2
DLTL−() such that L = L, where L is dened as for DLTL(). To
get at the result we are after we need to work with Muller automata
operating over  of the form A = (Q;−!; Qin;F) where:
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 Q;−! and Qin as in the case of a Bu¨chi automaton.
 F  2Q is a family of accepting sets of states.
Let  2 !. Then the notion of a run  : prf() −! Q of A over  is
as in the case of a Bu¨chi automaton. The denition of inf() is also as
before. The run  is said to be accepting i inf() 2 F . Naturally L(A),
the !-language accepted by A, is given by :  2 L(A) i there exists an
accepting run of A over .
The Muller automaton A = (Q;−!; Qin;F) is said to be determin-
istic i jQinj = 1 and −!  Q    Q is a deterministic transition
relation. In other words, whenever q
a−! q0 and q a−! q00, we have
q0 = q00. The well-known theorem of McNaughton [12] guarantees that
L  ! is S1S()-denable i there exists a deterministic Muller au-
tomaton operating over  such that L = L(A). This fact will be the
basis for the proof of the next result.
Lemma 5.2 Let L  !. If L is S1S()-denable then L is DLTL−()-
denable.
Proof: As remarked above L is S1S()-denable implies that there ex-
ists a deterministic Muller automaton A = (Q;−!; fqing;F) operating
over  such that L = L(A). We will exhibit a formula A 2 DLTL−()
such that LA = L(A).
An easy argument shows that it involves no loss of generality to as-
sume that A| apart from determinacy | has two additional properties:
(i) ; 62 F .
(ii) 8q 2 Q 8a 2 . 9q0. q a−! q0.
Determinacy and (ii) ensure that for every  2 ! the Muller au-
tomaton A has a unique run over . This fact will be crucial in what
follows.
Suppose F = ;. In this case we have that L = ;, so we set A = ?.
So suppose that F 6= ;. For each F 2 F we shall construct a formula
F . The required formula A dening L will then be the disjunction of
all such F .
First we extend −!  Q    Q to −!, where −! is the least
subset of Q  Q satisfying:
 q "−! q for every q 2 Q.
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 If q −! q0 and q0 a−! q00 then q a−! q00.
Next dene, for each q; q0 2 Q, the language of nite words Lq;q0  
by:
Lq;q0 = f j q −! q0g:
It is easy to see that each Lq;q0 is a regular subset of 
. Hence we can
x a regular expression q;q0 2 Prg() such that Lq;q0 = jjq;q0jj. Due to
the determinacy of A it follows at once that if q; q0; q00 2 Q such that
Lq;q0 \ Lq;q00 6= ; then q0 = q00.
Now let F = fq0; q1; : : : ; qn−1g with n  1. Then the formula F is
given by:
F =
_
q2F
hqin;qi
 ^
q0 62F
[q;q0]? ^
n−1^
j=0
[q;qj ]hqj ;qj1i>
!
;
where  denotes addition modulo n. The required formula A is then
dened as:
A =
_
F2F
F
Clearly A 2 DLTL−(). We wish to argue that L(A) = LA . So
rst suppose that  2 L(A). Let  : prf() −! Q be the (unique) run of
A over . We must have inf() 2 F since  is an accepting run. Assume
that inf() = F = fq0; q1; : : : ; qn−1g with n  1. There must exist a
 2 prf() such that () = q 2 F and for all  0 2 ,  0 2 prf()
implies ( 0) 2 F . This is so because inf() = F . If () = q then
 2 jjqin;qjj because (") = qin and (consequently)  being a run assures
us that qin
−! q. Now suppose ;  j= hq;q0i> for some q0 62 F . Then
there exists  0 2 jjq;q0jj such that  0 2 prf(). But this violates the
assumed property of  . Consequently, for every q0 62 F we must have
;  j= [q;q0]?. Hence ;  j=
V
q0 62F [q;q0]?.
Next suppose j 2 f0; 1; : : : ; n − 1g and  0 2 jjq;qj jj such that  0 2
prf(). Then by the assumed property of  there must exist  00 6= " such
that  0 00 2 prf() and ( 0 00) = qj1, because qj1 2 F = inf().
Clearly  00 2 jjqj ;qj1jj because ( 0) = qj . Thus ;  j= [q;qj ]hqj ;qj1i>
for every j 2 f0; 1; : : : ; n− 1g. We have now established that ; " j= F
where F 2 F . This in turn implies that ; " j= A and hence  2 LA .
Now assume that ; " j= A. Then it must be the case that ; " j= F
for some F 2 F with F = fq0; q1; : : : ; qn−1g, n  1. Consequently, there
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exist  2 prf() and q 2 F such that  2 jjqin;qjj and
;  j=
^
q0 62F
[q;q0]? ^
n−1^
j=0
[q;qj ]hqj ;qj1i>:
Let  be the unique run of A over . From the determinacy of A it
follows that () = q.
Claim: Suppose  0 2  is such that  0 2 prf(). Then ( 0) 2 F .
To see that the claim holds, let  0 2 prf() and ( 0) = q0. If q0 62 F
then  0 2 jjq;q0jj would lead to the contradiction that ;  j= hq;q0i>
for some q0 62 F . Thus the claim holds, which at once implies that
inf()  F .
If we now show that F  inf() we are done. So let j 2 f0; 1; : : : ; n−
1g. To show that qj 2 inf() assume that  0 2  such that  0 2 prf().
Let ( 0) = qi, say. We must show that there exists  00 such that
 0 00 2 prf() and ( 0 00) = qj .
If i = j then we can set  00 = " and be done. So suppose i 6= j. Then
clearly  0 2 jjq;qijj. But ;  j= [q;qi]hqi;qi1i> and hence there must
exist i 2 jjqi;qi1jj such that  0i 2 prf() so that ( 0i) = qi1. If
i1 = j then we can set  00 = i. Otherwise  0i 2 jjq;qi1jj and hence we
can nd i1 such that  0ii1 2 prf() such that ( 0ii1) = qi2. If
i 2 = j we set  00 = ii1, otherwise we proceed as before. Eventually
we will be done. 2
Theorem 5.3 Let L  !. Then the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) L is S1S()-denable.
(ii) L is DLTL()-denable.
(iii) L is DLTL−()-denable.
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 and the fact that
DLTL−() is a sublogic of DLTL(). 2
At present we do not know of a direct conversion of DLTL()-formulas
into DLTL−()-formulas. Although these two logics have the same ex-
pressive power in the sense of Theorem 5.3, it appears that DLTL()
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will admit more natural specications. In addition, it is a conservative
extension of LTL() even from a syntactic standpoint and hence conven-
tional LTL specications can be brought in with no overhead translation
costs.
We shall conclude this section by pointing out that star-free programs
can be used to capture the rst-order denable subsets of !. Admittedly
this is not a big surprise, but it illustrates once more that our method of
augmenting the expressive power of LTL is a natural one.
FO() will denote the rst-order theory of !-sequences generated by
. It is the fragment of S1S() obtained by eliminating set variables
from the syntax. We shall say that L  ! is FO()-denable i there
exists a sentence  in FO() such that L = L.
The set of star-free regular programs over  is denoted PrgSF() and
its syntax is given by:
PrgSF() ::= 0 j a j  + 0 j  j ; 0:
The set of nite words denoted by each star-free program is obtained via
the map jj  jj : PrgSF() −! 2 which is dened as follows: jj  jj =
 − jjjj and jj0jj = ;. The remaining cases are handled as before.
Next let ’ 2 FO(),  2  and I : Var −! f0; 1; : : : ; j j − 1g where
j j is the length of  . In case  = " we set I | viewed as a set of ordered
pairs | to the empty set. The notion  j=I ’ is dened in the obvious
way.
With each sentence ’ 2 FO() we can now associate the language of
nite words Lfin’ given by:
Lfin’ = f j  2  and  j= ’g:
We let SF fin() be the subset of 2

where L   is admitted as a
member of SF fin() i there exists a sentence ’ 2 FO() such that
L = Lfin’ . A well-known fact [13] is that SF
fin() and PrgSF() denote
each other in the following sense.
Proposition 5.4 Let L  . Then L 2 SF fin() i there exists  2
PrgSF() such that L = jjjj.
Next we recall a well-known characterization of FO()-denable sub-
sets of !. Let SF !() be the least subset of 2
!
which satises:
 ; 2 SF !().
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 If bL 2 SF !() then ! − bL 2 SF !().
 If bL1; bL2 2 SF !() then bL1 [ bL2 2 SF !().
 If L 2 SF fin() and bL 2 SF !() then f j  2 L and  2 bLg 2
SF !().
We then have the following characterization (see [20]).
Proposition 5.5 Let L  !. Then L 2 SF !() i L is FO()-
denable.
The star-free version of DLTL() will be denoted | for want of a
better notation | by DLTLSF() and its syntax is given by:
DLTLSF() ::= > j  j  _  j  U ( 2 PrgSF()):
Thus the only dierence is that the programs that are used to build
up the until-formulas are required to be star-free programs. All the
semantic notions concerning this logic are transported from DLTL() in
the natural manner. The fragment of DLTLSF() which corresponds to
DLTL−() has the syntax:
DLTL−SF() ::= > j  j  _  j hi ( 2 PrgSF()):
Once again, all the semantic notions concerning DLTL−SF() are trans-
ported from DLTL−() in the natural way.
We now wish to show that FO(), DLTLSF() and DLTL
−
SF() all
have the same expressive power.
Lemma 5.6 Let bL  !. If bL is FO()-denable then bL is DLTL−SF()-
denable.
Proof: Using Proposition 5.5 and following the denition of SF !(), we
now inductively dene the map g : SF !() −! DLTL−SF() as follows.
 If bL = ; then g(bL) = ?.
 Suppose bL = ! − bL1 for some bL1 2 SF !() with g(bL1) dened.
Then g(bL) = g(bL1).
 Suppose bL = bL1[ bL2 with bL1; bL2 2 SF !() so that both g(bL1) and
g(bL2) are dened. Then g(bL) = g(bL1) _ g(bL2).
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 Suppose L1 2 SF fin() and bL1 2 SF !() such that L = f j
 2 L1 and  2 bL1g and g(bL1) is dened. Let  2 PrgSF() such
that L = jjjj. The existence of  is guaranteed by Proposition 5.4.
Then g(bL) = hig(bL1).
It is now routine to verify that for each bL 2 SF !()
bL = f j ; " j= g(bL)g:
Hence bL is DLTL−SF()-denable. 2
The last step is to show that DLTLSF()-denability implies FO()-
denability. The proof will be syntactic and it will be convenient to go
through some preliminaries.
First let ’ 2 FO() and x; y be variables that do not appear in ’ (free
or bound). Then the formulas Rel(’; 0; x) and Rel(’; x; y) | describing
the relativizations of ’ | are dened inductively as follows:
 Rel(Ra(z); 0; x) = z  x ^Ra(z).
Rel(Ra(z); x; y) = x  z ^ z  y ^Ra(z).
 Rel(z1  z2; 0; x) = z2  x ^ z1  z2.
Rel(z1  z2; x; y) = x  z1 ^ z2  y ^ z1  z2.
 Rel(’; 0; x) = Rel(’; 0; x).
Rel(’; x; y) = Rel(’; x; y).
 Rel(’1 _ ’2; 0; x) = Rel(’1; 0; x) _ Rel(’2; 0; x).
Rel(’1 _ ’2; x; y) = Rel(’1; x; y) _Rel(’2; x; y).
 Rel((9z)’; 0; x) = (9z)(z  x ^ Rel(’; 0; x)).
Rel((9z)’; x; y) = (9z)(x  z ^ z  y ^ Rel(’; x; y)).
It is easy to see that both Rel(’; 0; x) and Rel(’; x; y) are members of
FO() for any ’ 2 FO().
Next we x for each  2 PrgSF() a sentence ’ 2 FO() such that
jjjj = Lfin’ . The existence of ’ is guaranteed by Proposition 5.4 and
the denition of SF fin().
Finally we inductively dene, for each  2 DLTLSF(), the formulas
SAT(; 0) and SAT(; x) as follows:
 SAT(>; 0) = SAT(>; x) = (8z)(z  z).
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 SAT(; 0) = SAT(; 0).
SAT(; x) = SAT(; x).
 SAT( _ ; 0) = SAT(; 0) _ SAT(; 0).
SAT( _ ; x) = SAT(; x) _ SAT(; x).
 Let  = 1 U2. Suppose rst that " 2 jjjj. Then
SAT(; 0) = SAT(2; 0) _ (SAT(1; 0) ^ (9x)(’1 ^ ’2 ^ ’3));
where
’1 = SAT(2; x);
’2 = (8y)(y < x  SAT(1; y));
’3 = Rel(’; 0; x):
Moreover,
SAT(; x) = SAT(2; x)_(SAT(1; x)^(9y)(x < y^’01^’02^’03));
where
’01 = SAT(2; y);
’02 = (8z)(x  z ^ z < y  SAT(1; z));
’03 = Rel(’; x; y):
Now, if it is the case that " 62 jjjj we disregard SAT(2; 0) and
SAT(2; x), respectively, above. In other words,
SAT(; 0) = SAT(1; 0) ^ (9x)(’1 ^ ’2 ^ ’3);
and
SAT(; x) = SAT(1; x) ^ (9y)(x < y ^ ’01 ^ ’02 ^ ’03);
We can now prove the following result.
Lemma 5.7 Let L  !. If L is DLTLSF()-denable then L is FO()-
denable.
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Proof: Let L  ! be given such that L = L with  2 DLTLSF(),
i.e. L = f j ; " j= g. It is now routine to check that SAT(; 0) is a
sentence of FO() and moreover that
L = f j  j= SAT(; 0)g:
Hence, L is FO()-denable. 2
Theorem 5.8 Let L  !. Then the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) L is FO()-denable.
(ii) L is DLTLSF()-denable.
(iii) L is DLTL−SF()-denable.
Proof: Follows easily from Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7. 2
6 Axiomatizations
Our axiomatization of the set of valid formulas of DLTL is an extension
of Segerberg’s axiomatization of PDL [17]. Moreover, our completeness
argument is based on the elegant proof of completeness of Segerberg’s
axioms due to Kozen and Parikh [9]. It will be convenient to rst axiom-
atize DLTL−.
We begin by augmenting the set of regular programs with the atomic
program 1. We set jj1jj = f"g. By abuse of notation this augmented set
of programs will also be denoted as Prg(). Next we dene the transition
relation−!Prg() (from now on written as just −!) to be the least subset
of Prg() Prg() yielded by the following rules:

a
a−! 1
 
a−! 1
 + 0 a−! 1

a−! 1
0 +  a−! 1
 
a−! 1
; 0 a−! 1; 0 if 1 6= 1
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 
a−! 1
; 0 a−! 0
 
0 a−! 00
; 0 a−! 00 if " 2 jjjj
 
a−! 0
 a−! 0;  :
This transition relation is extended to the relation −!  Prg()
  Prg() via:
  "−! 
 If  −! 0 and 0 a−! 00 then  a−! 00.
Finally the sets of programs a() and () for each  and each a
are dened as follows:
 a() = f0 j  a−! 0g.
 () = f0 j 9:  −! 0g.
Proposition 6.1 For each  and each a, both a() and () are nite
sets.
Proof: The proof follows easily by structural induction on . 2
We are now ready to present an axiomatization of DLTL− (Recall
that O
() Wa2hai). The logical system DLT L− is given as follows.
Axiom schemes:
(A0) All the tautologies of propositional calculus.
(A1) [] (  )  ([]  []).
(A2) h + 0i  hi _ h0i.
(A3) h; 0i  hih0i.
(A4) hi   _ hihi.
(A5) [](  [])  (  []).
(A6)   h1i.
(A7) O>.
(A8) hai>  Vb6=a[b]?.
(A9) hai  [a].
(A10) hi   _
W
a2hai
W
02a()h0i

; (" 2 jjjj).
(A11) hi  Wa2haiW02a()h0i; (" 62 jjjj).
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Inference rules:
(MP)
   

.
(TG)

[]
.
(A0) through (A5) and the inference rules together constitute an ax-
iomatization of PDL. The behaviour of 1 is captured by (A6). The re-
maining axiom schemes describe the linear time semantics provided for
regular programs in the setting of DLTL−. Due to Proposition 6.1 both
(A10) and (A11) are well-dened. It is easy to see that the axioms are
valid and that the inference rules preserve validity.
We shall say, as usual, that a formula  is (DLT L− −) consistent in
case is not a thesis derivable from the systemDLT L−. We shall prove
that every consistent formula is satisable. To this end, x a consistent
formula 0. Dene bcl(0) to be the least set of formulas containing cl(0)
(recall the denition of cl(0) in Section 4) and satisfying:
 If hi 2 bcl(0) and 0 2 a() thenh0i; haih0i 2 bcl(0).
 If h1i 2 bcl(0) then  2 bcl(0).
 hai> 2 bcl(0) for every a 2 .
Next dene cCL(0) as cCL(0) = bcl(0) [ f  j  2 bcl(0)g. As
usual, we will identify  with  in what follows.
Proposition 6.2 cCL(0) is a nite set.
Proof: Follows at once from Proposition 6.1. 2
In this section, an atom is a maximal consistent subset of cCL(0).
If A is an atom then bA will be the conjunction of all the formulas in A.
Let AT0 be the set of all atoms. We now dene the transition system
TS0 = (AT0;=)) where =)  AT0    AT0 is given by A a=) B ibA^hai bB is consistent. As before, the transition relation =) is extended
to =)  AT0   AT0 in the obvious way.
Lemma 6.3
(i) Suppose A;B 2 AT0 and  2 Prg() such that bA^ hi bB is consis-
tent. Then there exists  2 jjjj such that A =) B.
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(ii) Suppose hi 2 A 2 AT0. Then there exists B 2 AT0 and  2 jjjj
such that  2 B and A =) B.
Proof: Part (i) can be established by just repeating the proof of [9,
Lemma 1]. Now part (ii) follows easily from part (i) with the help of a
few tautologies of propositional calculus. 2
We are now ready to extract a model of 0 from TS0. We shall do
so by inductively dening a map b : ! −! AT0 and an ascending chain
of sequences 0  1  : : : where each i is in . In what follows we
will denote b(i) by Ai for each i 2 !. We shall also assume that we have
xed an enumeration of the countable set cCL(0).
 b(0) = A0 where A0 2 AT0 such that 0 2 A0. Further, 0 = ".
 Assume b(i) and i are dened. We say that the pair (hi; )
is a requirement at stage i provided the following conditions are
satised:
{   i and hi 2 Aj where j j = j.
{ For every  0 2 , if  0  i then  0 62 jjjj or  62 Ak where
j 0j = k.
Let RQi be the set of requirements at stage i. Assume that RQi = ;.
Let a 2  such that hai> 2 Ai. The fact that such an a exists and is
unique is guaranteed by (A7) and (A8). Since
W
A2AT0
bA is a thesis, it
follows from simple propositional reasoning that bA ^ hai bB is consistent
for some B 2 AT0. Consequently A a=) B. Now let b(i + 1) = B and
i+1 = ia. The construction now proceeds from stage i+ 1.
Assume now that RQi 6= ;. Let (hi; ) be the least member of
RQi in the enumeration we have xed for cCL(0). Let j = j j and
 0 = i. Then using (A10) and (A11) it is easy to show that there exists
0 such that  
0−! 0 and h0i 2 Ai. Moreover  62 Ai or " 62 jj0jj.
By part (ii) of Lemma 6.3, there exists B 2 AT0 and  00 2 jj0jj such
that Ai
 00
=) B and  2 B. Let  00 = b1b2 : : : bm. Then we can nd
B0; B1;    ; Bm 2 AT0 such that Ai = B0 and Bm = B and Bk bk=) Bk+1
for 0  k < m. We now extend b by:
b(i+ k) = Bk for 1  k  m:
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Further we dene i+k = ib1b2 : : : bk for 1  k  m. The construction
now proceeds from stage i+m.
Now consider the model M0 = (; V0) where  2 ! is the sequence
satisfying that i   for every i 2 !. Further, V0() = Aj j \ P for each
 2 prf(). It is a routine exercise to establish that for all  2 prf()
and  2 cCL(0), M0;  j=  i  2 Aj j. Hence M0; " j= 0 as required.
The system DLT L is obtained by replacing (A10) and (A11) with
the following axiom schemes:
(A12)  U  hi.
(A13)  U   _

 ^Wa2haiW02a()  U0 ; (" 2 jjjj).
(A14)  U   ^Wa2haiW02a()  U0; (" 62 jjjj).
It is an easy exercise to extend the completeness argument for DLT L−
to DLT L. Thus we have:
Theorem 6.4
(i) DLT L− is a sound and complete axiomatization of the set of valid
formulas of DLTL−().
(ii) DLT L is a sound and complete axiomatization of the set of valid
formulas of DLTL().
7 Conclusion
We have presented here an enriched version of LTL called DLTL. The
extension is obtained by indexing the until operator of LTL with regular
programs. We have shown that in terms of the complexity of the deci-
sion procedure and expressiveness, DLTL compares very favourably with
ETL. It is worth pointing out here that the decision procedure for DLTL
is carried out directly in terms of Bu¨chi automata whereas for ETL it
is carried out in terms of the so called set-subword automata, which are
then translated to Bu¨chi automata [21]. Two additional results that are
available for DLTL are: A characterization of the rst order fragment
of S1S in terms of the sublogics DLTL−SF and DLTLSF; and a relatively
clean axiomatization of DLTL− and DLTL. All these results demonstrate
that our means of bringing together propositional dynamic and temporal
logics in a linear time setting is natural.
It turns out that our idea extends smoothly to richer domains. In par-
ticular, we can obtain similar results concerning the so called !-regular
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product languages [19] in terms of the product version of DLTL. Roughly
speaking, a !-regular product language is a !-regular language L  !
generated by a distributed alphabet figKi=1 with  =
SK
i=1 i. The lan-
guage L is a product language in the sense it is a nite union languages
of the form L1⊗L2⊗  ⊗LK with each Li a regular subset of nite and
innite strings over i and ⊗ standing for the synchronized product op-
eration. In other words  2 ! is in L1⊗L2⊗  ⊗LK i   i (i.e. the
sequence obtained by erasing all symbols from  that are not in i) is in
Li for each i. The interesting distributed alphabets are of course those in
which the component alphabets are not pairwise disjoint. The !-regular
product languages can be used to capture the linear time behaviour of
a widely used model of distributed programs. These programs consist
of a xed set of nite state sequential programs that coordinate their
behaviours by performing common actions together. Our logical charac-
terization of !-regular product languages is obtained by taking boolean
combinations of formulas in
SK
i=1 DLTL(i).
Yet another extension is obtained by considering !-regular trace lan-
guages over a trace alphabet (; I) with I    being an irreflexive
and symmetric independence relation. Here by traces we mean the class
of -labelled posets known as Mazurkiewicz traces. These objects play
a fundamental role in the theory of distributed systems [2, 11]. It turns
out that !-regular trace languages can be captured by a natural exten-
sion of DLTL() denoted DLTL(; I). The main idea is that one must
use regular \parallel" programs instead of regular programs to index the
until operator. What is interesting about this characterization is that so
far there has been no comparable result concerning !-regular trace lan-
guages in terms of a modal logic with a xed point operator or in terms
of a linear time temporal logic. These results and related generalizations
will be reported in a forthcoming paper.
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